In December 2011, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of JPMorgan Chase (JPM) instructed the bank's Chief Investment Office to reduce the size of its Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) during 2012, so that JPM could decrease its Risk-Weighted Assets as the bank prepared to adopt the impending Basel III bank capital regulations. However, the SCP traders were also told to minimize the trading costs incurred to reduce Risk-Weighted Assets, while still maintaining the opportunity to profit from unexpected corporate bankruptcies. In an attempt to balance these competing objectives, head SCP derivatives trader Bruno Iksil suggested in January 2012 that the SCP expand a strategy first implemented in 2011 to buy large volumes of certain credit derivatives, while simultaneously selling large volumes of other credit derivatives. The strategy quickly proved unsuccessful, and JPM's Chief Investment Officer ordered Iksil and the other SCP traders to halt this strategy on March 23. However, losses continued to mount as the credit derivative positions were unwound, ultimately reaching $6.2 billion by December 2012.
Introduction
On April 6, 2012, Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal published the first news stories about a mysterious derivatives trader known as the "London Whale". The trader in question, Bruno Iksil, worked in the London office of the largest United States (US) bank holding company, JPMorgan Chase & Company (JPM). In response, bank officials maintained that Iksil's trading activities were not focused on short-term profits but were instead used to help JPM hedge certain of its structural risks. However, the articles questioned whether Iksil's derivative bets were so large that he was in fact exposing the bank to more risk.
JPM released its preliminary earnings results for the first quarter of 2012 just a week later on April 13, and Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon assured investors and analysts on the conference call that the matter was just a "tempest in a teapot", though evidence would later reveal that Iksil's failed trading strategy had lost over $1 billion by this date.
The bank set up an internal task force in early May to investigate the losses. When JPM reported its final first quarter financial results on May 10, Dimon acknowledged that the Chief Investment Office (CIO), the unit in which Iksil worked, had taken on more risk than previously thought because a recently implemented risk measurement model had been inadequate. At the same time, several of JPM's counterparties disputed the amount of collateral that had been assigned to Iksil's credit derivative contracts, thus raising doubts whether the CIO was complying with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles when estimating the fair value of its derivatives.
The US Senate began holdings hearings into the matter in June and launched a formal investigation in July. This investigation resulted in a 300-page report in March 2013, accompanied by an additional 600 pages of supporting exhibits. The internal JPM task force also released its own 130-page report in early 2013. Both of these reports detailed the flaws in Iksil's trading strategy, the violation of proper accounting treatment for the credit derivatives in question, and the failures in JPM's risk management system that allowed the losses and the accounting irregularities to occur.
Though CIO senior management halted Iksil's trading in March 2012, before the Bloomberg and Wall Street Journal articles were even published, the bank needed the rest of the year to unwind the credit derivatives trading book. Market losses continued to escalate, finally totaling $6.2 billion by December, as other investors were aware of the size and composition of JPM's derivatives holdings and traded against the firm as a result.
As a global diversified financial services firm, JPM is supervised by many different regulatory agencies, both in the US and internationally. These regulators later admitted to having been surprised when they first saw the April 6 articles, and they penalized JPM for its regulatory violations. JPM settled these charges in fall 2013 for a total penalty of $1 billion, including admitting wrongdoing in certain circumstances (see Figure 1 ).
The remainder of this overview case module is organized as follows. Sections 2, 3, and 4 provide background on JPM, the bank's Chief Investment Office, and credit default swaps, respectively. Section 5 summarizes the other case modules. See Appendix 1 for a timeline of key events and Appendix 2 for an organizational chart of key players. The holding company is managed on a line-of-business basis with six reportable segments (see Figure 2 ). In addition, JPM maintains a "Corporate / Private Equity" function that includes the firm's internal treasury department, a private equity group, the Chief Investment Office, corporate staff units, and other centrally managed expenses. (JPM 10-K 2011, 1, 79, 107) As can be seen in Figure 1 , JPM is supervised by numerous government agencies. The Federal Reserve Board acts as an "umbrella regulator" of the holding company structure. JPM provides a wide variety of financial services, yet its commercial bank subsidiaries continue to engage in the basic banking functions of taking deposits and making loans. In recent years, the amount of deposits held by JPM on behalf of its customers was consistently greater than the amount of money loaned by the bank. (Note that we refer to the difference between deposits and loans as "excess deposits" herein and in the other case modules.)
For example, as can be seen in Figure 3 , JPM had $1.128 trillion of deposits payable to customers at December 31, 2011, but only $724 billion of loan balances receivable, resulting in excess deposits of about $400 billion. By definition, JPM had not loaned out this money, so the bank needed a way to profitably yet safely invest these excess deposits. This task was assigned to the CIO unit, and it was the unit's primary responsibility. CIO invested the bank's excess deposits in Treasury bonds and other investment grade (i.e., high quality) fixed income securities, including corporate, municipal, and asset-backed bonds. This conservative investment approach was consistent with how other banks managed excess deposits, and the average credit rating for CIO's investments was AA+.
By December 2011, CIO managed a $350 billion portfolio of fixed income securities, an amount that was approximately double JPM's total stockholders' equity of $184 billion at that date. Because this bond portfolio was funded by deposits (most of which were uninsured corporate deposits, but part of which were covered by deposit insurance), CIO's primary financial regulator was the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (i.e., the primary regulator of JPM's national bank subsidiaries that had taken in the deposits). (US Senate Report, 21-22)
CIO had various additional objectives, including funding JPM's retirement plans, as well as hedging the risks associated with interest rates and mortgage servicing rights on behalf of other units within the bank.
One of CIO's other objectives was to partially hedge JPM's credit risk. Like other lenders, JPM is exposed to credit risk (also known as default risk), which is the risk that someone who has borrowed money from the bank is unwilling and/or unable to repay the money when due.
The JPMorgan Chase & Company Management Task Force (JPM Task Force) charged with internally investigating the CIO losses stated in its final report, "The Synthetic Credit Portfolio managed by CIO was intended generally to offset some of the credit risk that JPMorgan faces, including in its CIO investment portfolio and in its capacity as a lender." (JPM Task Force 
The Derivatives: Credit Default Swaps
As noted in Section 3, CIO used the SCP to attempt to offset some of the credit risk to which JPM was exposed. The SCP consisted of positions in credit default swap indices and related instruments.
A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is derived from the value of some other security. The value of a credit derivative is derived from the creditworthiness of an underlying fixed income security, such as an asset-backed, corporate, or government bond. One simple type of credit derivative is a credit default swap (CDS). A CDS contract is similar to an insurance contract in certain aspects. One party to the contract sells insurance or credit protection to the second party against the possibility that one or more borrower(s) named in the contract default(s) on a debt, such as by filing for bankruptcy. The protection buyer periodically pays premiums to the protection seller, similar to insurance premiums. The protection buyer is said to be "long protection" or "short credit risk", whereas the protection seller is said to be "short protection" or "long credit risk". However, unlike a typical insurance policy, a CDS contract does not require the protection buyer to have actual exposure to the underlying risk. In fact, a protection buyer and seller can use CDS to speculate on future changes in creditworthiness.
The size of a CDS contract or market is measured in what is termed "notional" or "net notional" amounts. The "notional" amount of a CDS contract is akin to the amount of insurance coverage purchased, not the much smaller annual premium paid. For example, if an investor pays $5 million per year to buy credit protection on a $100 million bond, the notional size of the contract is $100 million. The "net notional" amount reflects the difference between long and short notional amounts.
A credit index tracks a specific basket of credit instruments, and a credit tranche tracks a specific portion of a credit index. US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles require that credit derivatives and certain other financial instruments be adjusted to fair value every day, with the resulting profit and loss also being recorded on a daily basis, known as "mark to market" accounting. However, unlike exchange-traded securities (for example, common stock of companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average), credit derivatives trade in a much smaller, less liquid dealer market, which introduces greater uncertainty and discretion into the valuation process.
Credit derivative prices are quoted at a "bid-ask spread", representing the prices at which market makers are willing to buy from (at the lower bid price) or sell to (at the higher ask price) participants who are not market makers. Less liquid securities, such as credit derivatives, generally are quoted at wider bid-ask spreads than securities that are more actively traded.
Summary of the Case Modules JPMorgan Chase London Whale A: Risky Business
In December 2011, Dimon and Braunstein instructed CIO to reduce the size of the SCP during 2012, so that JPM could reduce its Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) as the bank prepared to adopt the impending Basel III bank capital regulations. However, Martin-Artajo, Iksil, and Grout were also expected to minimize the trading costs of decreasing RWA, while still maintaining the chance to profit from unexpected corporate bankruptcies. In an attempt to balance these multiple competing objectives, Iksil suggested in late January 2012 that SCP expand a strategy first implemented in 2011 to buy credit protection on (higher risk) high yield companies, while funding some of the premiums by selling protection on (lower risk) investment grade companies. The resulting rapid increase in trading caused the net notional size of the SCP portfolio to triple from $51 billion at year-end 2011 to $157 billion by March 31, 2012, and brought Iksil to the attention of Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal. Unfortunately, the trading strategy was not successful, as changes in credit spreads caused the value of protection owned by SCP to decrease more rapidly than did the value of protection that the traders had sold. Although Drew ordered the SCP traders to halt this strategy on March 23, losses continued to mount as the credit derivative positions were unwound, ultimately reaching $6.2 billion by December 2012.
JPMorgan Chase London Whale B: Derivatives Valuation
After consistently producing positive revenues through 2011, the SCP traders were alarmed by a consistent string of losses beginning in January 2012. In an effort to minimize the losses reported to their superiors until such time that market prices turned in their favor, Martin-Artajo, Iksil, and. Grout began valuing the largest SCP positions in a manner that was not consistent with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and JPM policy. GAAP requires that derivatives be adjusted to fair value each day, with the resulting gain or loss also being recorded in a company's accounting records. Whereas many firms choose to value their derivatives at the midpoint between the bid price and the ask price, since this option is offered as a safe harbor under GAAP, Grout was valuing SCP's positions using whichever side of the bid-ask spread was more favorable. The SCP fair values were reviewed by CIO's own Valuation Control Group (as required by banking regulators) and by the JPM Controller, but neither review raised any objection to the SCP marks. However, after the JPM Task Force uncovered evidence that the SCP traders had not estimated fair values in good faith, the bank restated its first quarter 2012 earnings on July 13, reducing consolidated total net revenue by $660 million (2.5%), which in turn reduced after-tax net income by $459 million (8.5%).
JPMorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, and Models
All major financial institutions use various risk limits, metrics, and models to measure and monitor the risk of their lending and investing activities. The amount of risk taken is measured on a daily or weekly basis using various risk metrics, and these amounts are compared with the relevant limits. Value at Risk (VaR) is one of the most commonly used ways to measure and monitor market risk. VaR is an estimate of the most that one or more financial instruments could decrease in value over a fixed time period (e.g., one day) with a given level of confidence (e.g., 95%). After large derivative positions in the SCP book caused the CIO to exceed not only its own VaR limit for four consecutive days in January 2012, but also the higher firm-wide VaR limit, the CIO changed to a new VaR calculation model on January 30, which appeared to immediately reduce CIO VaR by half. However, JPM later discovered that the new CIO VaR model was not properly implemented and included formula and operational errors, causing the bank to go back to using the previous model. Furthermore, the SCP traders and their managers also disregarded several other risk metrics during the 1 st quarter of 2012. The only risk limit that CIO management heeded is known as Credit Spread Widening 10% (CSW10%), which is the expected change in portfolio value if the credit spread on each position simultaneously widened by 10% of its current amount (e.g., from 2.00% to 2.20%). After Drew learned on March 23 that Iksil and the SCP had breached the CIO's mark-to-market CSW10% limit the day before, she ordered trading of the SCP portfolio to be halted immediately.
JPMorgan Chase London Whale D: Risk Management Practices
JPM prided itself on having the best risk management practices in the financial industry, surviving the 2007-2009 financial crisis in better shape than many of its competitors, and Dimon often spoke of the bank's "fortress balance sheet". Of course, a focus on risk management is vital to JPM's longevity, as is the case with all highly leveraged financial institutions. However, the JPM Task Force concluded that risk management practices at CIO were given less scrutiny by senior bank management than those of clientfacing businesses, despite the fact that CIO managed about $350 billion in assets, an amount almost double JPM's total stockholders' equity at December 31, 2011.
JPMorgan Chase London Whale E: Supervisory Oversight
As a diversified financial service provider and the largest US bank holding company, JPM is supervised by multiple regulatory agencies. JPM's commercial bank subsidiaries hold a national charter and therefore are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Since the CIO invested the surplus deposits of JPM's commercial bank units, the OCC was also CIO's primary regulator. During the critical period from late January through March 2012, JPM did not provide the OCC with required monthly reports that included CIO performance data and the results of CIO's internal reviews of the fair values assigned by traders to their derivative positions, yet OCC failed to request the missing information.
JPMorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures
On April 13, 2012, Braunstein participated in a conference call to discuss JPM's first quarter 2012 earnings, commenting that the purpose of Iksil's trading activity was to help JPM manage losses in a stressful credit environment, that trading decisions were made on a long-term basis, that SCP positions were transparent to banking regulators and also approved by the firm-wide risk management function, and that SCP's hedging function would be allowable under the Volcker Rule. On May 10, JPM finalized its first quarter financial results. At issue is whether the regulatory filings on April 13 and May 10, as well as Braunstein's and Dimon's verbal comments on those dates, were misleading and thus violated relevant securities laws enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
JPMorgan Chase London Whale G: Hedging Versus Proprietary Trading
In December 2013, a handful of US regulatory agencies jointly adopted final rules to implement Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which is often referred to as the "Volcker Rule". Section 619 prohibits banks from engaging in activities often considered to be particularly risky, including using the bank's own money to generate trading profits (known as proprietary trading) and owning hedge funds or private equity funds. Banking regulators designed the final prohibition against proprietary trading in part to help prevent future trading losses like those at JPM. Given the controversial nature of the Volcker Rule, the regulatory agencies received 18,000 comment letters, including a 67-page letter from JPM.
JPMorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross Border Regulation
As a global financial service provider, JPM is supervised by banking regulatory agencies in different countries. Iksil was based in JPM's London office, which was regulated by both the OCC and the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which served as the sole regulator of all financial services in the UK. Banking regulators in the US and the UK have entered into agreements with one another to define basic parameters for sharing information gleaned during bank examinations and even assisting one another with bank inspections under certain circumstances. However, the OCC apparently never requested assistance from its UK counterpart in examining CIO's London office even though the OCC did not assign any of its own London staff to examine these operations. JPM misled the FSA in much the same way that the bank misled the OCC. Form 10-K. Filed February 29, 2012 , for the year ended December 31, 2011. 1, 62, 125-163, 178-181, 184-198, 202-203 January 25 CIO CSBPV $12 million global limit breached again; CIO then remained continuously over this limit until May.
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January 26 CIO meeting at which Iksil proposed expanding purchases of credit protection on high-yield corporate bonds, while selling even larger amounts of default protection on investment-grade corporate bonds. The proposal was approved and implemented immediately.
January 27 SCP VaR = $126 million, over its temporary limit of $105 million.
January 30
Iksil expressed concern about the new strategy to his superior Javier Martin-Artajo and suggested letting the SCP positions expire. 
April 10
First trading day after the London Whale gained public attention.
The initially reported SCP daily loss of $6 million was revised upward to $395 million just 90 minutes later ($415 million final loss reported).
JPM provided the OCC with a summary list of CIO derivative positions, but did not include profit & loss data and omitted certain derivatives.
FSA met with CIO London management for the first time since the media stories. CIO management did not inform the FSA that cumulative losses from the SCP book were more than $700 million during the first quarter and were expected to and in fact did exceed $1 billion by the end of the trading day. On the earnings call, Dimon referred to the incident as a "tempest in a teapot", and Braunstein made possibly misleading statements.
April 16 JPM provided to the OCC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Federal Reserve a 13-page written presentation about the SCP book, which was the first written response to the matter given by the bank to its regulators. 
SeptemberOctober
Four regulators in the US and one in the UK reached settlement agreements with JPM, totaling $1.020 billion in penalties.
December 10 The Federal Reserve System, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, OCC, and SEC issued the final Volcker Rule.
